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Abstract
Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that
do not exactly match agents’ true contribution to principals’ objectives. Such
misalignment may impose diﬃculties for eﬀective incentive design. We analyze
to what extent implicit dynamic incentives such as career concerns and ratchet
eﬀects alleviate or aggravate these problems. Our analysis demonstrates that
the interplay between distorted performance measures and implicit incentives
implies that career and ratchet eﬀects have real eﬀects, that stronger ratchet
eﬀects or more distortion may increase optimal monetary incentives, and that
bureaucratic promotion rules may be optimal.
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A general problem for designing incentive schemes is that available performance mea-
sures seldom capture precisely agents’ true contributions to principals’ objectives.
Performance measures are typically inﬂuenced by stochastic factors that agents can’t
control, and they often do not reﬂect all aspects that principals care about. For in-
stance, quantitative performance measures often neglect important qualitative (soft)
aspects of an agent’s performance. Such measures are distorted from, or ’not well
aligned with’, the principal’s true objectives. As is well known, such misalignments
may impose severe diﬃculties for eﬀective incentive design. (Holmstrom and Mil-
grom 1991; Baker 1992; Feltham and Xie 1994; and Baker 2002.)
Baker (2002) argues that an understanding of how distorted performance mea-
sures aﬀect the design of incentive contracts may explain several issues and puzzles
in the literature; including (i) why high-signal-to-noise ratio performance measures
may receive low weight in an incentive scheme, (ii) how the distinction between
paying for ”inputs” versus paying for ”outputs” can be interpreted, and (iii) why
seemingly informative performance measures degrade, (Baker 2002, pp. 738-40).
The latter issue is illustrated by a school system that administers standardized tests
to its students, but does not use the scores to motivate teachers. A reason for not
including these seemingly informative test scores as a performance measure in an in-
centive system, is that teachers will then have incentives to ”teach to the test”, and
may thus engage in dysfunctional behavior that increases the performance measure
without increasing the school’s real objective.
We want to point out that, while it certainly is true that incentives to ”teach to
t h et e s t ”a r ea ﬀected by direct monetary rewards, it may nevertheless well be the
case that teachers face incentives to engage in this kind of behavior even if such direct
monetary rewards are absent. Good test scores may give the school administration a
signal that the teacher’s talent is high, and result in future salary increases. Or, test
scores may be used as a criterion to allocate teachers to diﬀerent classes. A complete
understanding of how distorted performance measures aﬀect overall incentive design
requires that implicit incentives are also taken into account.
In this paper we analyse the interplay between implicit dynamic incentives and
explicit incentives when performance measures are distorted. This latter issue has
been studied extensively in the accounting literature (Feltham and Xie 1994; Datar,
Kulp, and Lambert 2001 and Huges, Zhang, and Xie 2005), but implicit incentives
have not been examined in such a setting. Implicit incentives arise when explicit
contracts can be renegotiated as time unfolds. Hence, implicit incentives reﬂect
the fact that future periods’ pay depends on today’s performance. If today’s perfor-
mance improves the agent’s position in the labor market, career concerns are present,
(Fama 1980; Holmstrom 1982; and Gibbons and Murphy 1992). Ratchet eﬀects are
present if better performance today implies a tougher performance standard tomor-
row, (Weitzman 1976). Meyer and Vickers (1997) analyze dynamic incentives with
a non-distorted performance measure. We combine the two themes by adding infor-
mation about the agent’s talent given through distorted performance measures to
1Meyer and Vickers (1997), and by adding a talent factor to Feltham and Xie (1994).
First we consider the case where the principal can provide incentives on a veri-
ﬁable, but distorted, performance measure (z). In addition some information about
the agent’s talent and performance is provided to the principal (and the market)
through the non-veriﬁable value measure (y)t h a tr e ﬂects how the agent’s talent and
performance contribute to the principal’s true objective. In this case implicit incen-
tives are related both to the distorted and the undistorted performance measures
(and hence the degree of misalignments between them).
By using this model we show that both career and ratchet eﬀects do have real
eﬀects; neither can costlessly be neutralized by monetary incentives. Furthermore
we ﬁnd, contrary to what is found in models with non-distorted performance mea-
sures (e.g. Gibbons 1987; Meyer, Olsen, and Torsvik 1996; and Meyer and Vickers
1997), that stronger ratchet eﬀects may increase optimal monetary incentives. The
intuition behind the latter result is that ratchet eﬀects on the true value measure
(y) reduce the agent’s incentives to exert eﬀort and is optimally compensated by a
stronger monetary incentives on z. These results are partly driven by the fact that
performance measures are distorted, and partly by the fact that the principal uses
several signal for updating beliefs about the agent’s talent (as opposed to one signal
in e.g. Meyer and Vickers). We disentangle these inﬂuences, and show for instance
that career eﬀe c t so nt h et r u ev a l u em e a s u r ey have real eﬀects on equilibrium eﬀort
only when the veriﬁable measure z is distorted from y if the agent is risk-neutral.
Finally we notice that this dynamic model reproduces some of the results of the
static version (Baker 2002); that better alignment between the performance measures
increases monetary incentives, and that the better aligned the performance measure
is with the true value, the higher is the (total) surplus among the principal and the
agent. The ﬁrst of these two results is however not trivial since better alignments
strengthens the ratchet elements. This eﬀect tends to lower monetary incentives.
We can however show that this latter eﬀect will never dominate the direct eﬀect
of better alignments, and hence that monetary incentives do increase with better
alignments.
It is often the case that in addition to veriﬁable (and distorted) performance
measures, there are other non-veriﬁable measures that may yield valuable informa-
tion about the agent’s talent and performance. A typical case is one where quantity
aspects are veriﬁable but quality aspects are not, yet some information about these
quality aspects is observable for the relevant parties. Such information may be hard
or impossible to verify in a court, but may be used by principals and peers to asses
agents’ abilities and performance, and hence induce implicit incentives for agents to
exert eﬀort.
We also consider such a setting, and show that some new issues arise.1 In
particular, we point out the following features. First we show that incentives may
1In addition to measures y and z,t h e r ei sn o wat h i r dn o n - v e r i ﬁable measure q.W em a yt h i n k
of y reﬂecting the true mix of quality and quantity aspects that the principal cares about, z being
av e r i ﬁable measure of quantity aspects, and q b e i n gan o n - v e r i ﬁable measure of quality aspects.
2increase with more distortion in the (veriﬁable) performance measure, second that it
may well be advantageous (in terms of total surplus) that the veriﬁable performance
measure is distorted relative to the measure of true value. Finally we show that
distortion may be one explanation behind the observation that organizations often
use bureaucratic promotion rules.
To understand these results notice that the availability of the extra information
signal will aﬀect how the principal updates her beliefs about the agent’s ability.
This changes implicit incentives, and thus the monetary incentive provided by the
principal. Consider now the case where there are career incentives on the quality
signal, but all measures are well aligned. In this case the principal can reduce
monetary incentives by much since career incentives ensure that the agent exerts
valuable eﬀort. If, on the other hand, the quality signal is distorted so eﬀort on it
is not valuable for the principal, she has to keep monetary incentives high to steer
attention away from it. These are the cases were monetary incentives increase with
distortion.
The intuition behind the second result (that total surplus may increase with
distortion) is also related to the way the market updates its estimate of the agent’s
talent. If some non-veriﬁable measure of quality aspects is not aligned with the true
value, and implicit incentives on this measure induce the agent to focus on these
quality aspects, then it may be advantageous that explicit incentives can be used to
induce eﬀorts on quantity aspects rather than on a balanced mix of both aspects.
This is just to say that it may be advantageous that the veriﬁable measure is not
perfectly aligned with the measure of true value.
The choice of promotion rule is also related to which information is used by
the principal to update her estimate of the agent’s ability. Consider two diﬀerent
promotion rules: promote the agent with the highest expected talent given all avail-
able information, or promote the agent with best veriﬁable performance in the ﬁrst
period. The point we want to make is that promoting based on expected talent
creates implicit incentives which may steer the agent’s eﬀort towards activities that
have low value for the principal. By committing to promote exclusively on veri-
ﬁable information, the principal eﬀectively removes such implicit incentives. But
this commitment comes at a cost, since the principal runs the risk of promoting the
least ﬁtted. If this cost is relatively low, promoting based on the ex post ineﬃcient
bureaucratic rule may be preferable. This result thus extends the result in Milgrom
and Roberts (1988) and Prendergast (1999) that bureaucratic promotion rules may
be preferable also when activities are valuable (and not just to avoid non-productive
inﬂuence activities).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic model is outlined,
while the optimal contracts are derived in section 3. In section 4 we consider the
case where an additional non-veriﬁable measure provides some information about
the agent’s performance. First we show that incentives may increase with more
distortion (section 4.1). Then in section 4.2 we show that it may be advantageous (in
terms of total surplus) that the veriﬁable performance measure is distorted relative
to the measure of true value. The choice of promotion rule is analysed in section
34.3. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2T h e M o d e l
There is one agent, n tasks, and two periods. In each period the agent privately
supplies eﬀort at=( at1,a t2,...,a tn) on the n tasks. The agent’s choice of eﬀorts
determines the agent’s total contribution to the principal, denoted by yt. That is,
yt reﬂects everything the principal cares about, except for wages, in period t. We
assume that no contract on y c a nb ee n f o r c e di nc o u r tb e cause it is prohibitively
costly to specify this outcome ex ante in such a way that it can be veriﬁed by a third
party ex post. We do however assume that all parties—insiders as well as outsiders—
observe the y−signal ex post, and favorable realizations of this signal improves the
agent’s standing on the job market.
Let
yt = h0η + fat + εt,
where f = {f1,f 2,...,f n} is an n-dimensional vector of marginal products of the
agent’s eﬀorts, fat = f1at1+...+fnatn denotes the scalar product, and εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε)
represents random eﬀects. η is the agent’s unknown ability. The ability η is drawn
at the beginning of the ﬁrst period from an independent normal distribution with
mean Eη = m0 and variance σ2
η. The agent’s ability has productivity h0 for the
principal.
Let z be a veriﬁable performance measure, so monetary incentives can be pro-
vided through this signal. Incentives on this signal serves as a means to increase the
agent’s total contribution for the principal. Let
zt = η + gat + ζt,
where g ={g1,g 2,...,g n} is an n-dimensional vector of the marginal products of ac-
tions on the veriﬁable performance measure and ζt ∼ N(0,σ2
ζ) is the eﬀect of un-
controllable events. Let ζ be independent of ε and of η.
The agent which is risk-averse privately chooses actions ati,i=1 ,...,n. The
private cost of eﬀort in monetary units is denoted c(at),a n di s( f o rs i m p l i c i t y )





2 . The agent’s utility
function is exponential, and there is no discouning. We assume that the agent is
oﬀered a linear wage contract wt = At + αtzt.2 With linear compensation, ex-
ponential utility, and normal random variables, the agent’s certainty equivalent is
CE =
P
t [Ewt − c(at)] − r
2var(w1 +w2), where E is the expectation operator, and
r ≥ 0 measures the agent’s risk aversion.
The principal is risk neutral and has net beneﬁti np e r i o dt given by yt−wt. She
can observe neither the actions taken by the agent nor his ability. She only observes
2The focus on linear contracts can be justiﬁed by appeal to a richer dynamic model in which
linear payments are optimal Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
4the signals xt =( yt,z t) and may use it in every period to update her beliefs about
the agent’s ability.
The parties cannot commit not to renegotiate contracts. The second-period
contract will therefore be eﬃcient, given the information available at that time.
3O p t i m a l C o n t r a c t s
We ﬁrst characterize the optimal contract in the second, and last period. There are
no career incentives in this period, and the optimal incentives in period 2 correspond
to the optimal bonus in the one-period model.
Second period. The true expected value for the principal is E(y2 | x1)=h0E(η | x1)+
fa2, and the expected value of the veriﬁable measure is E(z2 | x1)=E(η | x1)+ga2,
where E(η | x1) reﬂects the updated belief about the agent’s ability3,a n di sg i v e n
by
E(η | x1)=Eη + ρz(z1 − Ez1)+ρy(y1 − Ey1). (1)
The exact expressions for the regression coeﬃcients ρi = ∂
∂iE (η | x1),i= y,z are
contained in Appendix A. Here we simply note that ρi ∈ [0,1] and depends on
the noise terms σ2
i,i= η,y,z, as well as the productivity parameter of ability h0.
F u r t h e r m o r ew en o t et h a tt h ei ft h ez−signal is more noisy than the y−signal (i.e.
σ2
ζ >σ 2
ε), more weight is put on y relative to z in estimating the agent’s ability.
The certainty equivalent for the agent in period 2 is CE2 = A2 + α2E(z2 |
x1)−c(a2)−r
2σ2
2c where the ﬁrst two terms reﬂects the expected wage Ew2 and σ2
2c :=
var(z2 | x1)=var(η | x1)+var(ζ). (See Appendix A for the exact expression.)
The agent chooses eﬀort a2 to maximize this certainty equivalent, and this yields
a2 = α2g. Total expected surplus in period 2 is






By maximizing this w.r.t. α2, taking into account the agent’s response, we obtain











In this expression fg = f1g1+...+fngn denotes scalar product, |g| denotes length of
the vector (so |g|2 =
Pn
i=1 g2
i )a n dθfg is the angle between vectors f and g,d e ﬁned
by cosθfg =
fg
|f||g|. We follow Baker (2002) and use the angle θfg as a measure of
distortion (or alignment).
The performance measure and the principal’s valuation of the marginal products
are perfectly aligned when g =γf, γ>0. All else equal the optimal incentive α∗
2 on
z is lower the more distorted is the performance measure (the larger is θfg and the
3The expectation is also conditional on the agent’s assumed (and equilibrium) eﬀort, say ˆ a1.
5lower is cosθfg). This follows since more distortion makes paying on z less eﬀective
for increasing y.
Naturally, the optimal incentive is decreasing in the agent’s risk aversion (r)
and in the variance of outcome (σ2
2c). All else equal (including |g| and θfg), it is
increasing in the length of the vector of marginal products f. This follows since the
length is a measure of the contribution of the agent’s action to the principal’s value
relative to the contribution of noise in the production function. Note also that in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fr i s kc o s t s( rσ2
2c > 0) the optimal incentive on z is non-monotone in




rσ2c and otherwise decreasing. This reﬂects two opposing considerations;
ﬁrst, the smaller is |g|, the larger one wants to make α2 to keep eﬀo r t st h es a m e( a
pure scaling eﬀect), and second, a desire to keep α2 low because of risk costs.
The sharing of the total surplus TCE2 will be determined by the parties’ bar-
gaining strength (and the terms speciﬁed in the initial contract). We assume that
the agent has some bargaining power and hence can obtain some share of the surplus.
If the agent can negotiate for himself some share s of the expected surplus TCE2 (at
the start of period 2), then the ﬁxed wage component A2 will be adjusted to reﬂect
the information (x1) revealed in period 1 about the agent’s ability as follows:
A2 =( h − α∗
2)E(η | x1)+const
where h = sh0 and the constant represent terms that do not depend on x1.T h e
formula follows from the fact that in equilibrium we must have sTCE2 = CE2.
The second-period wage contract oﬀered to the agent is:
w2(x1)=( h − α∗
2)E(η | x1)+α∗
2z2 + const
where the updated expected ability E(η | x1) for the agent is given by (1).
First period. Since the second-period compensation depends on the ﬁrst-period
signals, x1 =( y1,z 1), the agent has incentives to exert eﬀort in the ﬁrst period to
increase his market value. The agent thus chooses eﬀort according to
max
a1
{α1ga1 − c(a1)+( h − α∗
2)E(η | x1)+const}
⇒ a1 =( α1 + βz)g + βyf, where βz =( h − α∗
2)ρz,β y =( h − α∗
2)ρy. (4)
In the last expression βi is the implicit incentive on signal i = y,z. We see that this
consists of a positive career element (hρi) and a negative ratchet element (α∗
2ρi).
The net implicit incentive βi may be positive or negative, depending on the sign of
h − α∗
2.W en o t et h a tβy < 1,s i n c eh0ρy < 1, see Appendix A.
To characterize optimal ﬁrst-period incentives consider the total intertemporal
surplus, and note that the variance of total wages may be written as
var(w1 + w2)=var(α1z1 + βyy1 + βzz1 + α∗
2z2)





z2 − ρyy1 − ρzz1
¤
)
6where ˜ α1 = α1 + βz is the eﬀective incentive on the z−variable. The stochastic
variables in the two last lines are uncorrelated, and the variance of the latter (in
square brackets) is σ2
2c. The total intertemporal surplus may then be written as
TCE= TCE1+TCE∗
2,w h e r eTCE∗
2 is the (equilibrium) second period surplus and





(˜ α1 + α∗
2ρz)2σ2
1z +( hρy)2σ2





1z = var(z1), σ2
1y = var(y1) and σ1yz = cov(y1,z 1).4
Maximizing this expression, taking account of the agent’s eﬀort choice,
a1 =˜ α1g + βyf, we see that the optimal eﬀective incentive in period 1 is given by
˜ α∗
1 = α∗

































The ﬁrst line of the formula shows that eﬀective incentives on z c a nb es e e na s
consisting of three components: the monetary incentive (ﬁrst term), the implicit
incentive associated with the y-variable (second term), where both career and ratchet
eﬀects are present, and ﬁnally the implicit incentive on the z-variable, where only a
ratchet eﬀect is present.
The second line decomposes eﬀective incentives on z in two components; one
component (the ﬁrst) that depends on the degree of alignment between z and the
true value y (via the term fg), and a second component that reﬂects how incentives
are adjusted in response to risk costs. The latter is not (for a given second-period
bonus α∗
2) directly inﬂuenced by the degree of alignment between z and y.T h i s
yields the following.
Proposition 1 Let fg > 0.
(i) If the measures z and y are perfectly aligned (g =γf), then implicit incentives
have real eﬀects only if the agent is risk averse. For r>0 risk considerations imply
that eﬀective incentives are inﬂuenced by the career element in y and by the ratchet
element in z,a n db o t hi n ﬂuence eﬀective incentives negatively.
(ii) If z and y are not perfectly aligned (g 6=γf), implicit incentives have real eﬀects
also if r =0 . Apart from adjustments associated with risk costs, eﬀective incentives
on z are then aﬀected negatively by the net implicit incentives on y, so that a higher
career (ratchet) element in y reduces (increases) eﬀective incentives on z.
Corollary 1 Career incentives (on y) and monetary incentives (on z) are substi-













η and σ1yz = σ
2
η in the given speciﬁcation.
7As emphasized in the second line of (6), eﬀective incentives are adjusted for costs
partly associated with risk and partly with misalignment. To consider the latter in
isolation, suppose ﬁrst that the agent is risk neutral. Part (i) of the proposition then
follows since the ﬁrst-best is attainable when z is perfectly aligned with y and the
agent is risk-neutral (for g = γf and r =0we get ˜ α∗
1 =( 1−βy)/γ and a1 = f). All
implicit incentives are then completely neutralized. Note however that monetary
incentives are aﬀected since implicit incentives substitute monetary incentives on
z. Since the ratchet element in y reduces implicit incentives (on y)i ti so p t i m a l l y
compensated with stronger monetary incentives on z. Similarly, a higher career
element in y increases the implicit incentives (on y) and monetary incentives on z
are thus lowered. If g 6=γf,( ii) this compensation is not one-to-one since distortion
makes paying on z less eﬀective for increasing y, and implicit incentives on y will
then have real eﬀects. Implicit incentives on z will however have no real eﬀects, since
both the career element and the ratchet element in z can be costlessly neutralized
by monetary incentives when the agent is risk-neutral.
Consider now risk aversion (r>0). In addition to the adjustments considered
above, incentives on z will then also be adjusted in response to risk costs. From
equation (6) we see that risk costs aﬀect eﬀective incentives through two channels.
First, risk costs make it costly to neutralize ratchet eﬀects on z. Secondly, the career
element in y (the term related to h, and thus to the ﬁxed salary part A2) contributes
to the variance of payments, and since the y,z−variables are positively correlated
(σ1yz = cov(y1,z 1)=σ2
η > 0), this variance can be reduced by reducing the explicit
incentives on the z−variable. The latter eﬀect implies that career eﬀects on y have
real eﬀects both when z is distorted from, and when z is perfectly aligned, with y.
Combining parts (i)a n d( ii) proves the Corollary.
The fact that career elements have real eﬀects is at variance with results from
Meyer and Vickers (1997), who show that career eﬀects can be neutralized when
there is only one signal, the performance measure is non-distorted (i.e., g =γf ) and
the agent is risk averse. The above discussion highlights two mechanisms that can
modify this result. The ﬁrst is that distortion reduces the value of the surrogate
measure z,s oc a r e e re ﬀects are not compensated one-to-one. This mechanism applies
both for risk-neutral and risk-averse agents. The other mechanism is related to the
fact that the principal uses two signals for updating beliefs about the agent’s talent
(as opposed to one signal in Meyer and Vickers 1997). Since the career element in
y contributes to the variance of payments, and the principal cannot write explicit
contracts on y,c a r e e re ﬀects cannot be costlessly neutralized when the agent is
risk-averse, even if z is perfectly aligned with y.
From equations (4) and (6) we see that the ﬁrst-best is attainable when the
performance measure is non-distorted and the agent is risk neutral. This resem-
bles the result stated in Proposition 1 in Feltman and Xie (1994): if the true value
for the principal is not contractible information, then risk neutrality or a noiseless
performance measure is not suﬃcient to achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation. The per-
formance measure must also be perfectly aligned with the true value. Note however
that when career eﬀects are present (βy > 0) and the performance measures are to
8some extent aligned (fg >0), the presence of implicit incentives reduces the welfare
loss due to distorted performance measures. This follows since career incentives on
the principal’s true value attract the agent’s attention and eﬀort towards y.I nt h e
extreme case when f and g are orthogonal (and r =0 ) , optimal monetary incentives
are zero, but the agent exerts eﬀort a1 = βyf > 0.
In a static setting —and here for period 2— one sees that incentives on the perfor-
mance measure z are stronger the better aligned are the two measures. In a dynamic
setting the relationship is more complicated. From the formula (6) for the eﬀective
ﬁrst period incentive ˜ α∗
1, we see that there are both direct and indirect eﬀects asso-
ciated with better alignment. First there is a direct positive eﬀect in that fg gets
larger. (We keep |f||g| ﬁxed and consider only parameters that yield non-negative
incentives.) But second, there are indirect eﬀects working via the ratchet elements.
Although there are opposing eﬀects generated by dynamic implicit incentives, it
turns out that better alignment does in fact increase eﬀective incentives also in the
ﬁrst period, at least for all parameters that yield non-negative eﬀective incentives
in this model. We verify this in Appendix B. Note that this implies that monetary
incentives must also increase (and by even more) since the implicit incentive βz is
reduced.
In Appendix B we also verify the intuitively reasonable result that the equilib-
rium surplus (TCE) is also higher the better aligned is the performance measure
with the measure of true value. Thus we have:
Proposition 2 For parameters that yield non-negative eﬀective incentives we have:
As the performance measure z g e t sb e t t e ra l i g n e dw i t h( l e s sd i s t o r t e df r o m )t h em e a -
sure of value y, (i) optimal eﬀective and monetary incentives in both periods increase,
and (ii) the total surplus increases.
These results show that to the extent that design of performance measures is
f e a s i b l e ,i ti s( a l le l s ee q u a l )o p t i m a lt oc o n s t r u c to rc h o o s eam e a s u r et h a ti sl e a s t
distorted relative to the measure of true value. As we shall see in the next section,
this is however generally true only when such performance measures are veriﬁable.
4 Additional Non-Veriﬁable Measures
It is often the case that in addition to veriﬁable (and distorted) performance mea-
sures, there are other non-veriﬁable measures that may yield valuable information
about the agent’s performance. A typical case is one where quantity aspects are ver-
iﬁable but quality aspects are not, yet some information about these quality aspects
is observable for the relevant parties. Such information may be hard or impossible
to verify in a court, but may be used by principals and peers to asses agents’ abilities
and performance, and hence induce implicit incentives for agents to exert eﬀort.
We now consider such a setting, and show that some new issues arise. In par-
ticular, we point out three new features: (i) that incentives may increase with more
9distortion in the (veriﬁable) performance measure, and (ii) that it may well be ad-
vantageous (in terms of total surplus) that the veriﬁable performance measure (z)
is distorted relative to the measure of true value (y), and (iii) that distortion has
implication for the choice of promotion rules. To simplify the exposition in this
section, we consider risk-neutral agents. Furthermore, we focus on the case where
career concerns are present. Before we consider the three features mentioned above,
we derive the optimal incentives in the extended model.
Suppose there is an additional non-contractible ’quality’ variable
qt = kat + η + κt
where k is an n-dimensional vector, and κt ∼ N(0,σ2
κ) is a noise term.
In the second period there are no implicit incentives, and the optimal incentive






In period 1 the agent faces career incentives on the three measures y,z,q.T h e s e
incentives are given by βi =( h − α∗
2)ρi ≥ 0, i = y,z,q, where the ρi’s are the
regression coeﬃcients for the conditional expectation of ability (η), given ﬁrst period
observations (y1,z 1,q 1).5 The agent optimally chooses eﬀorts such the vector of
marginal costs equals the vector of marginal beneﬁts, i.e.
a1 =˜ α1g + βyf + βqk, ˜ α1 = α1 + βz (7)
As before α1 and ˜ α1 denote explicit (monetary) and eﬀective incentives, respectively,
on the veriﬁable performance measure z. Maximization of the ﬁrst-period surplus
fa1 − c(a1) with a1 given by (7), yields the optimal ﬁrst-period eﬀective incentive
˜ α∗
1 = α∗








where θkg is the angle between k and g;d e ﬁned by cosθkg =
gk
|g||k|. From equation (8)
it follows that when there are net career concerns on q,( βq > 0), eﬀective incentives
(on z) are adjusted down to account for the fact that the agent has incentives to
exert eﬀort to promote q. The strength of the incentive correction depends on how
well aligned the quality measure is to the veriﬁable performance measure z (which
is equal to the principal’s true value in the non-distorted case). If the measures are
well aligned (θkg ’small’, so cos(θkg) ≈ 1), eﬀective incentives are reduced by much
since q is then a valuable surrogate measure for z (and thus for y in the case of a
perfect measure, g = f). If the quality measure is highly distorted (θkg ’large’, so
cos(θkg) ≈ 0), q is not a valuable measure for z so eﬀective incentives on z are kept
high to steer attention in the direction of z.
5Note that the regression coeﬃcients are diﬀerent now compared to those outlined in the former
sections. In Appendix A we give the exact formulas.
10The above discussion highlights the role of the additional performance measure
q.I t a ﬀects ﬁrst-period optimal incentives, and the reason is that the availability
of q changes the way the principal updates her beliefs about the agent’s ability.
This changes implicit incentives, and thus the monetary incentives provided by the
principal. We shall see that this implies that there is a real diﬀerence between the
non-veriﬁable measures q and y in the way incentives are aﬀected.
4.1 Distortion and Incentives
Consider ﬁrst the relationship between distortion and incentive strength in the ex-
tended model. We want to make the point that in this setting it may well be the
case that ﬁrst-period incentives become stronger when the performance measure be-
comes more distorted. Note that this is at odds with result (i) in Proposition 2, and
hence illustrates that there is a real diﬀerence between the non-veriﬁable measures q
and y in the way they aﬀect incentives. To illustrate this we consider the following
example.
Example 1. Consider the case illustrated in Figure 1, where f =( 1 ,1), g =( 0 ,g 2)
and k =( k1,0).H e r e z and q measure diﬀerent aspects of the agent’s perfor-
mance (e.g. quantity and quality, respectively), and the two measures are orthogo-
nal; cos(θkg)=0 . To simplify matters, suppose further that y is non-informative
(σ2
ε = ∞), so βy = ρy =0 . To avoid obvious scaling eﬀects, assume also that
|g| = |f|.T h e n e ﬀective ﬁrst-period incentives are ˜ α∗
1 = α∗
2 =c o s ( θfg)=1 /
√
2.
Note that these incentives are here not aﬀected by career eﬀects since (i) there is by
assumption no such eﬀects on y, and (ii) the orthogonality of z and q implies that
career incentives on q does not aﬀect the agent’s actions in the z−dimension.
[Figure 1 about here]
Next consider the case of perfect alignment between z and y, i.e. g = f.E ﬀective









2. In this case z and q are to some extent aligned, and career eﬀects on q
will then also to some extent provide incentives for actions that promote z.H e n c e
monetary incentives on z are adapted and adjusted for these implicit incentives. The
stronger are the implicit incentives on q, the smaller are now the eﬀective incentives





We see that eﬀective incentives are smallest in the non-distorted case ( ˜ α∗P
1 < ˜ α∗
1)
when the implicit career incentives on q are strong and/or there are scaling eﬀects
such that
|k|




2 − 1.T h e r ei st h u sa
range of parameters where all eﬀective incentives are positive, and where they are
smallest in the non-distorted case.
We state the more general condition for eﬀective incentives to be smaller in the
non-distorted case in the following proposition. To avoid obvious scaling eﬀects we
11compare veriﬁable measures with the same ’length’ |g|, and normalize this to be
equal to |f|.
Proposition 3 Suppose the agent experiences career incentives and that all signals
are informative. Comparing veriﬁable measures of equal ’length’ |g|, and normalized
to |g| = |f|, we have: While second-period (and static) incentives (α∗
2 =c o s ( θfg))
are maximal when the veriﬁable performance measure (z) is non-distorted (i.e. when
θfg =0 ), ﬁrst-period incentives are lower for a non-distorted compared to a distorted
measure when
(1−α∗





[(h − 1)cos(θkf) − (h − α∗
2)cos(θkg)] < 0.
(9)
The formula follows from (8), noting that α∗
2 =1in the non-distorted case. The
ﬁrst component of the formula is the diﬀerence in monetary incentives, the second
part is the diﬀerence in the implicit incentives associated with the y-variable, while
the last component is the diﬀerence in the implicit incentives associated with the
q-variable. First we note that if q is non-informative (ρq =0 ) then according to
Proposition 2(i) the condition will never be satisﬁed, given that parameters are such
that eﬀective incentives are non-negative. We see that the condition can hold only
if q is informative (ρq > 0) and better aligned with the true value measure y than
with the distorted performance measure z;i . e .cos(θkf) > cos(θkg).
W es e et h a te ﬀective incentives on z are adjusted down to account for the fact
that the agent has career incentives on q, and that the strength of the incentive
correction depends on how distorted q is relative to z (which is equal to y in the
non-distorted case). The statement in the proposition holds true when q is ’close’
to y (θkf small) so eﬀective incentives on z can be reduced by much in the case of
a perfect measure, but q is distorted away from z (θkg large) so incentives on z are
kept high to steer attention towards z.
The fact that monetary incentives are adjusted to balance implicit incentives
is common in agency models where dynamic eﬀects are present. This follows sim-
ply because the ﬁrst-best is not attainable, so the principal’s goal is to use all
available instruments to tie the agent’s eﬀorts as close to the ﬁrst-best eﬀorts as
possible. What is left, i.e. the loss relative to the ﬁrst-best value induced by eﬀort
not being aligned with f is what Datar et al. (2001) deﬁne (in a static setting) as
performance measure incongruity. With two veriﬁable performance measures they
deﬁne incongruity (in our notation) as |f−(α1g1 + α2g2)|
2,i . e . a s|f − a|
2,s i n c e
eﬀort is a = α1g1 + α2g2 in their setting. In our setting with one veriﬁable per-
formance measure and implicit incentives, this measure of incongruity is given by
|f − a|
2 =
¯ ¯f(1 − βy)−
¡
(α1 + βz)g + βqk
¢¯ ¯2. The monetary incentive (α1)i sc h o s e n
to minimize this loss.
The following proposition shows that it is in fact typically the case that ﬁrst
period eﬀective incentives are highest for some measure that is not perfectly aligned
with f.
12Proposition 4 Consider given normalized vectors f and k (each of length 1)w i t h
fk =c o s ( θfk): =c ∈ [0,1).S u p p o s eh 6=1 . Then among all performance measures
with normalized vector |g| =1 ,t h eﬁr s t - p e r i o db o n u si sl a r g e s tf o rs o m em e a s u r e
that is not aligned with f.
Proof. See Appendix B
4.2 Non-Distorted Performance Measure Is Not Optimal
In this section we consider the relationship between distortion and total surplus. We
consider variations in the performance measure (z), and in particular variations in
its degree of distortion from the true value, as measured by the angle θfg between
vectors g and f. In a static case it will be optimal to have a veriﬁable performance
measure (z) that is completely aligned with the true value (y), i.e. such that θfg =0 ,
or equivalently g = γf, γ>0.T h e ﬁrst-best can then be achieved under risk
neutrality (by setting α = γ−1).
For the dynamic case we want to point out that, unless the non-veriﬁable ’quality
measure’ q is completely aligned with the true value y, it will not be optimal to have
g completely aligned with f.T h u s ,in the presence of dynamic implicit incentives it
will in most cases not be optimal to have a ’perfect’ veriﬁable performance measure.
The intuition is fairly simple; when there are (say) career incentives on q,t h e
agent’s attention is drawn in the direction deﬁn e db yv e c t o rk. Ideally the agent’s
eﬀorts should be aligned with f.W h e nk and f are not aligned, monetary incentives
on g should ideally draw the agent’s attention towards f, and this will generally not
be least costly to do when g is perfectly aligned with f.















a2(α2)=α2g, a1(˜ α1)=˜ α1g + βyf + βqk
Consider a marginal variation in the component gi;t h i sy i e l d s
∂TCE∗
∂gi
=( fi − a1i)˜ α∗
1 +( fi − a2i)α∗
2
= ((1 − βy)fi − ˜ α∗
1gi − βqki)˜ α∗
1 +( fi − α∗
2gi)α∗
2
W es e et h a tf o rg = γf (perfect alignment) the second term in the above expression
vanishes, but the ﬁrst term does not, and hence such perfect alignment will not be
optimal.
In fact, the formula shows that some linear combination, say g = µf+λk,w i l lb e
optimal. In practice it will hardly be possible to ﬁne-tune performance measures to
6For notational simplicity we drop the terms capturing the talent factor η.
13ﬁnd the optimal balance, so to characterize the optimum may not be so interesting.
The point we want to make is that some ’distorted’ performance measure may in
these cases well be better than a non-distorted one.
Proposition 5 When there is a distorted non-veriﬁable performance measure (q)
that generates implicit incentives, it is not optimal that the veriﬁable performance
measure (z)i sn o n - d i s t o r t e d .
Proposition 5 is related to results in Datar, Kulp, and Lambert (2001). That
paper studies how the principal should weigh diﬀerent veriﬁable performance mea-
sures when agents are risk averse and the performance measures can be distorted.
The main insight from the paper is that the weights are chosen to minimize the
incongruity between the ﬁrm’s outcome and the agent’s overall performance, and to
minimize the risk premium that must be paid to the agent to compensate him for
bearing the risk. In our paper the issue of balancing performance measures does
not arise (since only one performance measure is veriﬁable). However, Datar, Kulp,
and Lambert (2001) do also consider a situation where one performance measure
is aligned and one is distorted. In this case they show that the aligned measure
does not receive all weight in the contract so that the agent’s overall performance
measure (α1z1 +α2z2 in our notation) is not perfectly aligned with y. The intuition
behind this result is that the principal can trade-oﬀ some of the congruity to save
on risk costs. Our result is however not driven by risk considerations, but by the
fact that a distorted performance measure can counteract implicit incentives so as
to maximize the overall alignment between k, z,a n dy.
4.3 Distortion and the Choice of Promotion Rules
In this section we analyze how distortion aﬀects the desirability of two diﬀerent
promotion rules. The ﬁrst rule is the ex post eﬃcient promotion rule: promote
the agent with the highest expected talent, given all information at date 2. The
second rule is an ex post ineﬃcient (bureaucratic) rule: promote the agent with best
veriﬁable performance in period one. (Thus we assume here that the principal can
commit to such a rule.) The point we want to make is that promoting according to
rule 2 may improve the incentives for agents to allocate their eﬀort correctly (seen
from the principal’s view), but the principal runs the risk of promoting the least
ﬁtted since not all information is used to update the estimates of agents’ abilities.
The two promotion rules thus illustrate an important trade-oﬀ. Promoting based on
expected talent creates implicit incentives since the principal will use all information
available to update her estimate of agents’ talent. This includes information created
from agents’ activities on tasks that may be of low value for the principal. By
committing to promote exclusively on veriﬁable information, the principal eﬀectively
removes such implicit incentives. But this commitment comes at a cost, since the
principal runs the risk of promoting the least ﬁtted.
Prendergast (1999) point out that bureaucracy, where rules rather than discre-
tion are used to allocate resources, is a central feature of organizations. A prominent
14example is the use of seniority in promotion and layoﬀ decisions, independent of prof-
itability considerations. Prendergast shows that some degree of bureaucracy can be
desirable in a setting where the agent can corrupt a subjective performance signal
by unproductive inﬂuence activities. Here we complement this analysis by showing
that a bureaucratic rule can also be preferable when all of the agent’s activities are
valuable for the principal7.
The structure of this section is the following. First we calculate the agent’s gain
of being promoted (the prize in the tournament). Then we describe the contest,
derive the agents’ eﬀort choices, calculate the optimal incentives, and characterize
the equilibrium ﬁrst-period value. The ﬁrst-period value is the ﬁrst-best value minus
the loss due to implicit incentives along the vectors k, f and g. Clearly, promotion
based on the bureaucratic rule will eliminate the ﬁrst-period loss due to implicit
incentives on k and f, but it will yield some loss in period two compared to the ex
post eﬃcient rule. This loss is related to how valuable the extra information given by
the information signals y and q is for updating the beliefs about the agents’ ability,
and to the productivity of talent.
The prize. The principal and the promoted agent, say agent 1, negotiate the wage
in period 2. Given the same negotiation process as before, the agent gets a wage8
w2(x1
1)=( h − α∗
2)E(η1 | x1
1)+const,





1 − ˆ a1
1)+const., (10)
ξ1




m := ( ρzg + ρyf + ρqk),
and ˆ a1
1 is the anticipated (and equilibrium) eﬀort choice.
The contest. Consider two symmetric agents. According to the ex post eﬃcient rule,
agent 1 will win iﬀ E(η1 | x1
1) >E (η2 | x2
1). In equilibrium the agents’ eﬀorts will be
equal (ˆ a1
1 = ˆ a2
1), hence we see that agent 1 will win when ξ1+ma1
1 >ξ 2+mˆ a2
1. The
agent’s expected reward in the contest is thus (for given ˆ a2
1) a function of ma1
1,s a y
W(ma1














mi = ωmi, (12)
7Prendergast (1999, p 38) states that ”[t]o illustrate the incentive to act bureaucratically, two
ingredients are necessary. First, some measures of performance must be corruptible.” This statement
and the ensuing analysis may leave the impression that some form of unproductive activity or
inﬂuence on the part of the agent is necessary to explain bureaucracy as a rational response to
measurement problems in agency. Our model shows that such an explanation is valid under a much
wider set of circumstances.
8Assuming independent talent variables, there is no extra information in the observation that
the agent has won.
15where ω is deﬁned by the last equality as the expression in square brackets, R is
the prize obtained by the winner of the contest, and φ2(·) is the density of the
distribution of ξ2 − ξ1.
The marginal return to eﬀort in the contest thus consists of two parts. The
ﬁrst part is the marginal value of being allotted the right to negotiate (with the
principal) over the ﬁxed salary part. This occurs with probability 1
2 in equilibrium,
given symmetric agents. The second part is the increased probability of winning the
contest multiplied with the prize awarded to the winner. This prize is the added value
for the agent of being promoted, thus R = sTCE2−u2,w h e r esTCE2 is the share of
the expected surplus that the agent can negotiate for himself when promoted, and
u2 is his reservation value if not promoted. The increased probability of winning the
contest is given by the density φ2(0) = 1/(2πVx)1/2,w h e r eVx = var(ξ2 − ξ1).








1i)=0 i =1 ,2,...,n
where c0(a1
1i)=a1
1i. In addition to explicit ﬁrst-period incentives we here have
implicit incentives (the second term) induced by the contest for being promoted in
period 2. Substituting for these implicit incentives and for m as deﬁned above we
see that equilibrium eﬀort is given by
ˆ a1
1 =( α + ωρz)g + ωρyf + ωρqk. (13)
Equilibrium eﬀort is thus a mix of the usual vectors, just with other implicit incen-
tives.





Maximizing this expression taking account of the agent’s eﬀort choice ˆ a1
1,w ed e r i v e
the optimal ﬁrst-period incentive:
e α∗
1 = α∗








We see that the optimal incentive has the same structure as before, just with other
implicit incentives.
We now compare the total surplus for period 1 for the cases (i) where there
are implicit incentives on all information signals and (ii) when there are implicit
i n c e n t i v e so n l yo nt h ev e r i ﬁable signal. The former case corresponds to the ex post
eﬃcient promotion rule (based on x) and the latter corresponds to the bureaucratic
rule (based on z). Eﬀorts in the two cases can be written as e αg+tn,w h e r en =
ωρyf + ωρqk, and t = {0,1} depending on which promotion rule that is used. The
TCE in period 1 can be written







|f − e αg−tn|
2 .
16T h el a s tt e r mi nt h i sf o r m u l af o rT C Ei st h el o s sr e l a t i v et ot h eﬁrst-best value
induced by eﬀort not being aligned with f. (As noted above, this loss is taken by
Datar et al. (2001) as a measure of performance measure incongruity.)
Lemma 1 Let TCE1x and TCE1z be the optimal ﬁrst-period surpluses when pro-
motion is based on x and on z, respectively. We have:
(i) TCE1z >TCE 1x if |k| is suﬃciently large.
(ii) TCE1z >T C E 1x if g is suﬃciently well aligned with f (i.e θgf is suﬃciently
small).
(iii) TCE1z >T C E 1x if y is uninformative and the distortion between k and f is
large.
(iv) TCE1z <T C E 1x if |k| is suﬃciently small or q is suﬃciently uninformative
(i.e. if |k|ρq is suﬃciently small).
We refer the reader to Appendix B, which gives the exact expression for the
diﬀerence in the ﬁrst-period surpluses for the two cases. Intuitively if the loss due
to the implicit incentives along k is large, then promoting based on z will yield a
larger ﬁrst-period surplus. This occurs when the vector of marginal products of
eﬀort in the non-veriﬁable measure q has large components, so that it is ’easy’ for
the agent to obtain high realizations of this measure. When promotion is based in
part on this measure, the agent has then strong incentives to divert his eﬀorts in
this direction. When this diversion eﬀect is suﬃciently strong, it induces a large
ﬁrst-period loss. From a ﬁrst-period perspective it would then be better to totally
remove the incentives on q by basing the promotion solely on z.
Promotion based on z will on the other hand yield some loss in period 2, com-
pared to promotion based on highest expected talent. We now consider this loss.
Second-period values. The expected second-period value associated with talent, given
promotion based on z,i s







1 = ηi + g˜ a1 + ζi
1, ˜ a1 is the common equilibrium eﬀort, and E(ηi | zi
1)=
˜ ρz(ηi + ζi
1 − Eη)+Eη = µi. Similarly, the expected second-period value when
promotion is based on x1 is











Using properties of the normal distribution, we can ﬁnd exact expressions for
the values Nx and Nz.




Vx := var(ξ2 − ξ1)=2
h










17(i) The second-period gain induced by basing promotion on x rather than on z is
given by








where Φ0(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
(ii) The variance Vx is decreasing in σ2
ε, σ2
κ and σ2
ζ, and increasing in σ2
η and in h0.









Proof. See Appendix B.
The second-period gain must be compared to the ﬁrst-period loss (with the exact
magnitude given in Appendix B). The latter depends on, and is increasing in, the
length |k|, while the former does not. Hence for large |k| it is clearly better to
promote based on z. On the other hand, the second-period gain is increasing in the
productivity of talent (h0), while the ﬁrst-period loss is bounded in this parameter.
Hence, if this productivity is large, it is better to promote based on x.T h u sw eh a v e
the following
Proposition 6 For |k| suﬃciently large it is better to promote on the basis of the
veriﬁable (and distorted) measure z only. For |k| small and/or q suﬃciently un-
informative (i.e. for |k|ρq suﬃciently small), promotion based on z is inferior to
the ex post eﬃcient promotion rule based on x. The latter is true also for h0 (the
productivity of talent) suﬃciently large.
We end this section by noting that the second-period gain from promoting based
on highest expected talent depends on the variance of ability. Intuitively, if this
variance is large, the second-period gain of promoting based on x rather than z
is low. In fact, the next Lemma shows that when the variance of ability becomes
suﬃciently large, there is no extra information about the agent’s talent contained in
ap r o m o t i o nr u l eb a s e do nx relatively to a promotion rule based on z.
Lemma 3 limσ2
η→∞ (Nx − Nz)=0
Proof. See Appendix B.
For large uncertainty about ability, it is thus the relative magnitudes of the ﬁrst
period surpluses that become decisive for the choice of promotion rule. Using Lemma
1 we therefore have the following:
Proposition 7 For suﬃciently large ability variance σ2
η we have: promotion based
on z only is better than the ex post eﬃcient promotion rule if (a) g is suﬃciently
well aligned with f,o r( b )y is uninformative and the distortion between k and f is
large.
185C o n c l u s i o n
A general problem for designing incentive schemes is that available performance mea-
sures seldom capture precisely agents’ true contributions to principals’ objectives.
In this paper we have analyzed to what extent implicit dynamic incentives such as
career concerns and ratchet eﬀects may alleviate or aggravate these problems.
First we considered the case where the principal provides incentives on a veriﬁ-
able, but distorted, performance measure, and in addition some information about
the agent’s performance is provided to the principal (and the market) through a
non-distorted but non-veriﬁable measure of true value. In this case implicit incen-
tives are related both to the distorted and the non-distorted performance measures
(and hence the degree of misalignments between them).
The analysis demonstrated that implicit dynamic incentives have important real
eﬀects in such settings, and that these eﬀects are in several respects diﬀerent from
the corresponding eﬀects in settings where a single non-distorted performance mea-
sure is available. In particular, we found that both career and ratchet elements
have real eﬀects; neither can costlessly be neutralized by monetary incentives, and
that stronger ratchet eﬀects may increase optimal monetary incentives. The main
mechanism behind these results is that the veriﬁable performance measure serves
as a surrogate measure for the true value. Hence if implicit incentives on the true
value is weakened, the principal has to boost monetary incentives to ensure that the
agent maintain the same level of eﬀort.
The second model we present captures the fact that in addition to a veriﬁable
(and distorted) performance measure, there are often other non-veriﬁable measures
that may yield valuable information about the agent’s performance. The availability
of these measures will speciﬁcally aﬀect the way the principal and the market update
their estimates about the agent’s talent. A typical case is one where quantity aspects
are veriﬁable but quality aspects are not, yet some information about these quality
aspects is observable for the relevant parties. In this setting we show that some new
issues arise. Among other things show that explicit incentives may increase with
more distortion in the (veriﬁable) performance measure. This eﬀect occurs when
more distortion induces the principal to increase monetary incentives in order to
maintain an appropriate balance of the agent’s eﬀort among tasks. Hence in this
case, and opposed to what is suggested in Kerr (1975), it may be appropriate to
”reward for A, while hoping for B”.
We ﬁnally analyze how the availability of distorted performance measures aﬀects
the desirability of diﬀerent promotion rules. Bureaucracy, where rules rather than
discretion are used to allocate resources, is a central feature of organizations, and
a prominent example is the use of seniority in promotion and layoﬀ decisions, inde-
pendent of proﬁtability considerations. This motivated the analysis of two diﬀerent
promotion rules: promote the agent with the highest expected talent, given all infor-
mation at date 2, or promote the agent with best veriﬁable performance in period
one. We show that promoting according to the bureaucratic rule 2 may improve
the incentives for agents to allocate their eﬀort correctly (seen from the principal’s
19view), but the principal runs the risk of promoting the least ﬁtted since not all infor-
mation is used to update the estimates of agents’ abilities. The two promotion rules
thus illustrate an important trade-oﬀ. Promoting based on expected talent creates
implicit incentives since the principal will use all information available to update her
estimate of agents’ talent. This includes information created from agents’ activities
on tasks that may be of low value for the principal. By committing to promote
exclusively on veriﬁable information, the principal eﬀectively removes such implicit
incentives. But this commitment comes at a cost, since the principal runs the risk
of promoting the least ﬁtted.
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21Appendices
A Technicalities
In this appendix we provide more details regarding some of the calculations in this
paper.
A.1 Regression Coeﬃcients




η + fat + εt
zt = η + gat + ζt.
We seek E(z2 | z1,y 1) and E(η | z1,y 1).T h ec o v a r i a n c em a t r i x e s(z2,z 1,y 1) and





































By inverting and applying well-known formulas (e.g. DeGroot 1970) we obtain:
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We note that h0ρy < 1.
Consider the case outlined in Section 4. In this case the information signals are
yt = h0η + fat + εt
zt = η + gat + ζt
qt = η + kat + κt.































































































BP r o o f s


























F r o m( 3 )w eh a v efg = α∗
2K0,w h e r eK0 = |g|2+rσ2
2c. Better alignment will thus
increase α∗
2.D e ﬁning K = |g|2 + rσ2
1z,w eh a v em o r e o v e rf r o m( 6 )
˜ α∗

























This is positive for all parameter values that yield non-negative ˜ α∗
1. This proves the
ﬁrst part of the proposition.
Consider next the equilibrium total surplus TCE∗
1 + TCE∗
2. From the envelope
property, and taking into account that the equilibrium ﬁrst period eﬀort is a∗
1 =
˜ α∗



























































2 =( fi − giα∗
2)α∗
2
All in all we thus have, for the equilibrium total surplus
∂TCE∗
∂gi
= Afi − Bgi
where A,B are independent of i. The formula shows that the surplus is maximal
when the vector g is perfectly aligned with the vector f. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Consider a vector g that is a linear combination of f and
k, i.e. that lies in the plane spanned by f and k:
g = λf + µk, λ,µ ∈ R
We have |g|2 = λ2 +2 λµ(fk)+µ2, so the normalization |g|2 =1requires that
λ2 +2 λµc + µ2 =1 (15)
Note that we here have
α∗
2 = fg = λ + µfk = λ + µc
since c := fk =c o s ( θfk). By substituting this in (15), note that the restriction on
admissible values for λ,µ is equivalent to
(α∗
2)2 + µ2(1 − c2)=1
This equation can be considered as deﬁning α∗




1 − µ2(1 − c2)
This relation describes how the optimal static bonus α∗
2 = fg depends on the scalar
µ, given that we require g to lie in the plane spanned by f and k, and to be of length
1.
Now consider the optimal ﬁrst period bonus, given by (8). Taking into account
that all vectors are normalized to be of length 1, and substituting for the implicit
incentives βy,βq we have
˜ α∗
1 =( 1− [h − α∗
2]ρy)α∗
2 − [h − α∗
2]ρq cos(θkg),
24where now cos(θkg)=kg = λ(kf)+µ = λc+µ. Recall from above that α∗
2 = λ+µc,
and that we hence my write cos(θkg)=λc+µ = α∗
2c+µ(1−c2).T h u sw eh a v et h e
following expression for the optimal ﬁrst period bonus
˜ α∗
1 =( 1− [h − α∗
2]ρy)α∗








Taking into account the dependence of α∗
2 on µ, this equation describes how the
parameter µ inﬂuences ˜ α∗
1 partly directly via its inﬂuence on cos(θkg), and partly
indirectly through its inﬂuence on α∗
2.











Evaluating this derivative at µ =0w es e et h a tw eh a v e
dα∗
2







2(0),0) = −[h − 1]ρq(1 − c2)
Thus we see that the ﬁrst period bonus ˜ α∗
1 will increase by increasing µ when h<1
and reducing µ when h>1.S i n c e g = f for µ =0 , this shows that the bonus is
largest for some g 6= f. ¥
P r o o fo ff o r m u l a( 1 2 ) .To simplify notation we assume in this proof that Eη =





1 − ˆ a1)
Given that the agent wins, he will negotiate with the principal. The principal
assumes a1
1 = ˆ a1.T h e ﬁxed wage A2 is adjusted so that sTCE2 = CE2,w h i c h
implies
A2(x1
1)=( h − α∗
2)E(η1 | x1








If the agent works a1
















1 − ˆ a1)+ga∗
2) − c(a∗
2)
= hξ1 +( h − α∗
2)m(a1
1 − ˆ a1)+s(fa∗
2 − c(a∗
2))
= hξ1 +( h − α∗
2)ma1
1 + ˆ C
where ˆ C is deﬁned by the last equality. Let u2 be the reward if the agent loses. The
agent wins if ξ1 − ξ2 > m(a
2
1 − a1
1), where in equilibrium a2
1 = ˆ a2
1 = ˆ a1.L e tΦ(ξ)







hξ1 +( h − α∗
2)ma1

































Diﬀerentiating this, and evaluating the derivative at a1
1 = a2

















1 + ˆ C − u2
i
φ2(0)mi
The ﬁrst integral is zero, since φ2 ¡
ξ1¢
is symmetric around Eξ1 =0 . Substituting
for ˆ C we see that in equilibrium (for a1
1 = ˆ a1) the last square bracket equals s(fa∗
2 −
c(a∗
2)) − u2 = R. This proves formula (12). ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .Let ∆ =2 ( TCE1z − TCE1x). We will show that
∆ = −γ(2 − γ)|f|
2 ¡




1 − cos2 θgk
¢
+2λ(1 − γ)|f||k|(cosθfgcosθkg − cosθkf)
where γ = ωρy and λ = ωρq. The statements in the lemma follow from this formula.
To prove the formula consider (to simplify notation we set Eη =0in this proof)















(f − ˜ αg − tn)2
The optimal (eﬀective bonus) ˜ α is given by




2 · TCE1 = f2 − (f − ˜ αg − tn)(f − ˜ αg − tn)
= f2 − (f − ˜ αg − tn)(f − tn) − 0
= f2 − (f − tn)2 +˜ αg(f − tn)
= f2 − (f − tn)2 +
1
g2(fg − tng)2
We have ∆/2=TCE1(t =0 )− TCE1(t =1 )and thus







= −n(2f − n)+
(ng)
g2 (2f − n)g
26For n = γf + λk we get
∆ =
(ng)
g2 (2f − n)g − n(2f − n)
=
1





γ(2 − γ)(fg)2 − λ2(kg)2 +[ λ(2 − γ) − λγ](fg)(kg)
¢
−(γ(2 − γ)f2 − λ2k2 +[ λ(2 − γ) − λγ](fk))

















= −γ(2 − γ)f2 ¡
1 − cos2 θfg
¢
+ λ2k2 ¡
1 − cos2 θgk
¢
+2λ(1 − γ)|f||k|(cosθfgcosθkg − cosθkf)
This proves the lemma. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .In this proof we set Eη =0to simplify notation. Consider










1).H e r e˜ ρz is the relevant






(obtained e.g. from ρz by letting σ2
ε,σ2




















Let φ3(·) be the density and Φ3(·) the CDF for the normal variable
µ =˜ ρz
¡

















where Φ0(·) is the CDF for a standard normal N(0,1) variable, and the last equality
follows from Φ3(y)=Φ0(y/
√
Vz), Vz = var(µ).N o t et h a t


















27Vx = var(ξ2 − ξ1)=2
£










This proves the ﬁrst part of the lemma. Substituting for ρz,ρ y,ρ q in the last formula,
we see by direct diﬀerentiation and limiting operations that the last part of the
lemma also holds true. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .
We ﬁrst note that
Vx = var(ξ2 − ξ1)=2
£















where ρz,ρ y,ρ q are given in Appendix A, and we have






































































, ˜ ρz → 1,
Vz,V x →∞

















Vz (Vx − Vz).T h el e m m ai st h u s
proved if we show that (Vx − Vz) stays bounded as σ2
η →∞ .W eh a v e
(Vx − Vz)/2=
£












The result follows if we show that
£
(ρz + ρyh0 + ρq) − ˜ ρz
¤
σ2
η stays bounded. From
t h ee x p r e s s i o n sa b o v ew eh a v e
£



































From this expression we see that
£
(ρz + ρyh0 + ρq) − ˜ ρz
¤
σ2
η does indeed stay bounded,
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